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Abstract
Consider a stochastic process being controlled across a communication channel. The control signal that is transmitted across
the control channel can be replaced by a malicious attacker. The controller is allowed to implement any arbitrary detection
algorithm to detect if an attacker is present. This work characterizes some fundamental limitations of when such an attack can
be detected, and quantifies the performance degradation that an attacker that seeks to be undetected or stealthy can introduce.
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1 Introduction
Using communication channels to inject malicious data
that degrades the performance of a cyber-physical sys-
tem has now been demonstrated both theoretically and
practically Farwell & Rohozinski (2011), Kuvshinkova
(2003), Mo et al. (2014), Pasqualetti et al. (2013),
Richards (2008), Slay & Miller (2007). Intuitively, there
is a tradeoff between the performance degradation an
attacker can induce and how easy it is to detect the
attack Teixeira et al. (2012). Quantifying this tradeoff
is of great interest to operate and design secure cyber-
physical systems (CPS).
As explained in more detail later, for noiseless systems,
zero dynamics provide a fundamental notion of stealth-
iness of an attacker, which characterizes the ability of
an attacker to stay undetected even if the controller can
perform arbitrary tests on the data it receives. However,
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sign of optimal stealthy attacks in stochastic cyber-physical
systems.
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similar notions for stochastic systems have been lack-
ing. In this work, we consider stochastic cyber-physical
systems, propose a graded stealthiness notion, and char-
acterize the performance degradation that an attacker
with a given level of stealthiness can induce. The pro-
posed notion is fundamental in the sense that we do not
constraint the detection test that the controller can em-
ploy to detect the presence of an attack.
Related work Security of cyber-physical systems is a
growing research area. Classic works in this area focus on
the detection of sensor and actuator failures in control
systems Patton et al. (1989), whereas more recent ap-
proaches consider the possibility of intentional attacks at
different system layers; e.g., see Pasqualetti et al. (2015).
Both simple attacks, such as jamming of communication
channels Foroush & Mart´ınez (2013), and more sophis-
ticated attacks, such as replay and data injection at-
tacks, have been considered Mo & Sinopoli (2010), Smith
(2011).
One way to organize the literature in this area is based
on the properties of the considered cyber-physical sys-
tems. While initial studies focused on static systems
Dan & Sandberg (2010), Giani et al. (2011), Liu et al.
(2009), Mohsenian-Rad & Leon-Garcia (2011), Teixeira
et al. (2010), later works exploited the dynamics of the
system either to design attacks or to improve the per-
formance of the detector that a controller can employ
to detect if an attack is present Bhattacharya & Bas¸ar
(2013), Hamza et al. (2011), Maharjan et al. (2013),
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Manshaei et al. (2011), Zhu & Mart´ınez (2011), Zhu
et al. (2013). For noiseless cyber-physical systems, the
concept of stealthiness of an attack is closely related
to the control-theoretic notion of zero dynamics (Basile
& Marro 1991, Section 4). In particular, an attack is
undetectable in noiseless systems if and only if it ex-
cites only the zero dynamics of an appropriately defined
input-output system describing the system dynamics,
the measurements available to the security monitor, and
the variables compromised by the attacker Fawzi et al.
(2014), Pasqualetti et al. (2013). For cyber-physical sys-
tems driven by noise, instead, the presence of process
and measurements noise offers the attacker an additional
possibility to tamper with sensor measurements and con-
trol inputs within acceptable uncertainty levels, thereby
making the detection task more difficult.
Detectability of attacks in stochastic systems remains
an open problem. Most works in this area consider de-
tectability of attacks with respect to specific detection
schemes employed by the controller, such as the classic
bad data detection algorithm Cui et al. (2012), Mo &
Sinopoli (2010). The trade-off between stealthiness and
performance degradation induced by an attacker has also
been characterized only for specific systems and detec-
tion mechanisms Kosut et al. (2011), Kwon et al. (2013),
Liu et al. (2011), Mo et al. (2014), and a thorough anal-
ysis of resilience of stochastic control systems to arbi-
trary attacks is still missing. While convenient for anal-
ysis, the restriction to a specific class of detectors pre-
vents the characterization of fundamental detection lim-
itations. In our previous work Bai & Gupta (2014), we
proposed the notion of -marginal stealthiness to quan-
tify the stealthiness level in an estimation problem with
respect to the class of ergodic detectors. In this work,
we remove the assumption of ergodicity and introduce
a notion of stealthiness for stochastic control systems
that is independent of the attack detection algorithm,
and thus provides a fundamental measure of the stealth-
iness of attacks in stochastic control systems. Further,
we also characterize the performance degradation that
such a stealthy attack can induce.
We limit our analysis to linear, time-invariant plants
with a controller based on the output of an asymptotic
Kalman filter, and to injection attacks against the actu-
ation channel only. Our choice of using controllers based
on Kalman filters is not restrictive. In fact, while this
is typically the case in practice, our results and analy-
sis are valid for arbitrary control schemes. Our choice of
focusing on attacks against the actuation channel only,
instead, is motivated by two main reasons. First, actua-
tion and measurements channels are equally likely to be
compromised, especially in networked control systems
where communication between sensors, actuators, plant,
and controller takes place over wireless channels. Sec-
ond, this case has received considerably less attention in
the literature – perhaps due to its enhanced difficulty –
where most works focus on attacks against the measure-
ment channel only; e.g., see Fawzi et al. (2014), Teixeira
et al. (2010). We remark also that our framework can be
extended to the case of attacks against the measurement
channel, as we show in Bai & Gupta (2014) for scalar
systems and a different notion of stealthiness.
Finally, we remark that since the submission of this
work, some recent literature has appeared that builds
on it and uses a notion of attack detectability that is
similar to what we propose in Bai & Gupta (2014), Bai
et al. (2015) and in this paper. For instance, Kung et al.
(2016) extends the notion of -stealthiness of Bai et al.
(2015) to higher order systems, and shows how the per-
formance of the attacker may differ in the scalar and
vector cases (in this paper we further extend the setup
in Kung et al. (2016) by leveraging the notion of right-
invertibility of a system to consider input and output
matrices of arbitrary dimensions). In Zhang & Venkita-
subramaniam (2016), the authors extend the setup in
Bai et al. (2015) to vector and not necessarily stationary
systems, but consider a finite horizon problem. In Guo
et al. (2016), the degradation of remote state estimation
is studied, for the case of an attacker that compromises
the system measurements based on a linear strategy.
Two other relevant recent works are Weerakkody et al.
(2016) that uses the notion of Kullback-Liebler diver-
gence as a causal measure of information flow to quantify
the effect of attacks on the system output, while Chen
et al. (2016) characterizes optimal attack strategies with
respect to a linear quadratic cost that combines attack-
ers control and undetectability goals.
Contributions The main contributions of this paper
are threefold. First, we propose a notion of -stealthiness
to quantify detectability of attacks in stochastic cyber-
physical systems. Our metric is motivated by the
Chernoff-Stein Lemma in detection and information
theories and is universal because it is independent of
any specific detection mechanism employed by the con-
troller. Second, we provide an information theoretic
bound for the degradation of the minimum-mean-square
estimation error caused by an -stealthy attack as a
function of the system parameters, noise statistics, and
information available to the attacker. Third, we charac-
terize optimal stealthy attacks, which achieve the max-
imal degradation of the estimation error covariance for
a stealthy attack. For right-invertible systems (Basile
& Marro 1991, Section 4.3.2), we provide a closed-form
expression of optimal -stealthy attacks. The case of
single-input single-output systems considered in our
conference paper Bai et al. (2015) is a special case of this
analysis. For systems that are not right-invertible, we
propose a sub-optimal -stealthy attack with an analyti-
cal expression for the induced degradation of the system
performance. We include a numerical study showing
the effectiveness of our bounds. Our results provide a
quantitative analysis of the trade-off between perfor-
mance degradation that an attacker can induce versus
a fundamental limit of the detectability of the attack.
2
Paper organization Section 2 contains the mathemat-
ical formulation of the problems considered in this pa-
per. In Section 3, we propose a metric to quantify the
stealthiness level of an attacker, and we characterize how
this metric relates to the information theoretic notion
of Kullback-Leibler Divergence. Section 4 contains the
main results of this paper, including a characterization
of the largest performance degradation caused by an -
stealthy attack, a closed-form expression of optimal -
stealthy attacks for right invertible systems, and a sub-
optimal class of attacks for not right-invertible systems.
Section 5 presents illustrative examples and numerical
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Problem Formulation
Notation: The sequence {xn}jn=i is denoted by xji
(when clear from the context, the notation xji may also
denote the corresponding vector obtained by stacking
the appropriate entries in the sequence). This notation
allows us to denote the probability density function of a
stochastic sequence xji fxj
i
, and to define its differential
entropy h(xji ) as (Cover & Thomas 2006, Section 8.1)
h(xji ) ,
∫ ∞
−∞
−fx˜j
i
(tji ) log fx˜j
i
(tji )dt
j
i .
Let xk1 and y
k
1 be two random sequences with probability
density functions (pdf) fxk1 and fyk1 , respectively. The
Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) (Cover & Thomas
2006, Section 8.5) between xk1 and y
k
1 is defined as
D
(
xk1
∥∥yk1) , ∫ ∞
−∞
log
fxk1 (t
k
1)
fyk1 (t
k
1)
fxk1 (t
k
1)dt
k
1 . (1)
The KLD is a non-negative quantity that gauges the
dissimilarity between two probability density functions
with D
(
xk1
∥∥yk1) = 0 if fxk1 = fyk1 . Also, the KLD is gen-
erally not symmetric, that is,D
(
xk1
∥∥yk1) 6= D(yk1∥∥xk1). A
Gaussian random vector x with mean µx and covariance
matrix Σx is denoted by x ∼ N (µx,Σx). We let I and
O be the identity and zero matrices, respectively, with
their dimensions clear from the context. We also let Sn+
and Sn++ denote the sets of n × n positive semidefinite
and positive definite matrices, respectively. For a square
matrix M , tr(M) and det(M) denote the trace and the
determinant of M, respectively.
We consider the setup shown in Figure 1 with the fol-
lowing assumptions:
Process:The process is described by the following linear
time-invariant (LTI) state-space representation:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk,
yk = Cxk + vk,
(2)
Controller
Actuator Process
Channel
Sensor
 uk
u˜k
uk
y˜k
Fig. 1. Problem setup considered in the paper.
where xk ∈ RNx is the process state, uk ∈ RNu is the
control input, yk ∈ RNy is the output measured by the
sensor, and the sequences w∞1 and v
∞
1 represent process
and measurement noises, respectively.
Assumption 1 The noise random processes are inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequences of
Gaussian random vectors with wk ∼ N (0,Σw), vk ∼
N (0,Σv), Σw ∈ SNx++, and Σv ∈ SNy++.
Assumption 2 The state-space realization (A,B,C)
has no invariant zeros (Basile & Marro 1991, Section
4.4). In particular, this assumption implies that the
system (A,B,C) is both controllable and observable.
Assumption 3 The controller uses a Kalman filter to
estimate and monitor the process state. Note that the
control input itself may be calculated using an arbitrary
control law. The Kalman filter, which calculates the
Minimum-Mean-Squared-Error (MMSE) estimate xˆk of
xk from the measurements y
k−1
1 , is described as
xˆk+1 = Axˆk +Kk(yk − Cxˆk) +Buk, (3)
where the Kalman gain Kk and the error covariance ma-
trix Pk+1 , E
[
(xˆk+1 − xk+1)(xˆk+1 − xk+1)T
]
are calcu-
lated through the recursions
Kk = APkC
T (CPKC
T + Σv)
−1, and
Pk+1 = APkA
T −APkCT (CPkCT + Σv)−1CPkAT + Σw,
with initial conditions xˆ1 = E[x1] = 0 and P1 = E[x1xT1 ].
Assumption 4 Given Assumption 2, limk→∞ Pk = P ,
where P is the unique solution of a discrete-time algebraic
Riccati equation. For ease of presentation, we assume
that P1 = P , although the results can be generalized to
the general case at the expense of more involved notation.
Accordingly, we drop the time index and let Kk = K and
Pk = P at every time step k. Notice that this assumption
also implies that the innovation sequence z∞1 calculated
as zk , yk − Cxˆk is an i.i.d. Gaussian process with
3
zk ∼ N (0,Σz), where
Σz = CPC
T + Σv ∈ SNy++. (4)
LetG(Z) denote theNy×Nu matrix transfer function of
the system (A,B,C). We say that the system (A,B,C) is
right invertible if there exists anNu×Ny matrix transfer
function GRI(Z) such that G(Z)GRI(Z) = INy .
Attack model: An attacker can replace the input se-
quence u∞1 with an arbitrary sequence u˜
∞
1 . Thus, in the
presence of an attack, the system dynamics are given by
x˜k+1 = Ax˜k +Bu˜k + wk,
y˜k = Cx˜k + vk. (5)
Notice that the sequence of measurements y˜∞1 generated
by the sensor in the presence of an attack u˜∞1 is dif-
ferent from the nominal measurement sequence y∞1 . We
assume that the attacker knows the system parameters,
including the matrices A, B, C, Σw, and Σv. The attack
input u˜∞1 is constructed based on the system parameters
and the information pattern Ik of the attacker. We make
the following assumptions on the attacker’s information
pattern:
Assumption 5 The attacker knows the control input
uk; thus uk ∈ Ik at all times k. Additionally, the attacker
does not know the noise vectors for any time.
Assumption 6 The attacker has perfect memory; thus,
Ik ⊆ Ik+1 at all times k.
Assumption 7 The attacker has causal information; in
particular, Ik is independent of w∞k and v∞k+1 for all k.
Example 1 (Attack scenarios) Attack scenarios sat-
isfying Assumptions 5-7 include the cases when:
(i) the attacker knows the control input exactly, that is,
Ik = {uk1}.
(ii) the attacker knows the control input and the state,
that is, Ik = {uk1 , xk1}.
(iii) the attacker knows the control input and de-
layed measurements from the sensor, that is,
Ik = {uk1 , y˜k−d1 } for some d ≥ 1.
Stealthiness of an attacker: The attacker is con-
strained in the input u˜∞1 it replaces since it seeks to
be stealthy or undetected by the controller. If the con-
troller is aware that an attacker has replaced the correct
control sequence u∞1 by a different sequence u˜
∞
1 , it can
presumably switch to a safer mode of operation. Notions
of stealthiness have been proposed in the literature be-
fore. As an example, for noiseless systems, Pasqualetti
et al. (2013) showed that stealthiness of an attacker
is equivalent to the existence of zero dynamics for the
system driven by the attack. Similar to Pasqualetti
et al. (2013), we seek to define the notion of stealthiness
without placing any restrictions on the attacker or the
controller behavior. However, we need to define a similar
notion for stochastic systems when zero dynamics may
not exist. To this end, we pose the problem of detecting
an attacker by the controller as a (sequential) hypoth-
esis testing problem. Specifically, the controller relies
on the received measurements to decide the following
binary hypothesis testing problem:
H0 : No attack is in progress (the controller receives y
k
1 );
H1 : Attack is in progress (the controller receives y˜
k
1 ).
For a given detector employed at the controller to select
one of the two hypotheses, denote the probability of false
alarm (i.e., the probability of deciding H1 when H0 is
true) at time k by pFk , and the probability of correct
detection (i.e., the probability of deciding H1 when H1
is true) at time k + 1 by pDk .
One may envisage that stealthiness of an attacker im-
plies pDk = 0. However, as is standard in detection the-
ory, we need to consider both the quantities pFk and p
D
k
simultaneously. 1 In fact, intuitively, an attack is harder
to detect if the performance of any detector is indepen-
dent of the received measurements. In other words, we
define an attacker to be stealthy if there exists no detec-
tor that can perform better (in the sense of simultane-
ously achieving higher pDk and lower p
F
k ) than a detec-
tor that makes a decision by ignoring all the measure-
ments and making a random guess to decide between the
hypotheses. We formalize this intuition in the following
definition.
Definition 1 (Stealthy attacks) Consider the prob-
lem formulation stated in Section 2. An attack u˜∞1 is
(i) strictly stealthy, if there exists no detector such that
pFk < p
D
k for any k > 0.
(ii) -stealthy, if, given  > 0 and 0 < δ < 1, for any
detector for which 0 < 1 − pDk ≤ δ for all times k,
it holds that
lim sup
k→∞
−1
k
log pFk ≤ . (6)
Intuitively, an attack is strictly stealthy if no detec-
tor can perform better than a random guess in decid-
ing whether an attack is in progress. Further, an at-
tack is -stealthy if there exists no detector such that
0 < 1 − pDk ≤ δ for all time k and pFk converges to zero
exponentially fast with rate greater than  as k →∞.
1 For instance, a detector that always declares H1 to be true
will achieve pDk = 1. However, it will not be a good detector
because pFk = 1.
4
Performance metric: The requirement to stay
stealthy clearly curtails the performance degradation
that an attacker can cause. The central problem that
we consider is to characterize the worst performance
degradation that an attacker can achieve for a specified
level of stealthiness. In the presence of an attack (and if
the controller is unaware of the attack), it uses the cor-
rupted measurements y˜∞1 in the Kalman filter. Let ˆ˜x
∞
1
be the estimate of the Kalman filter (3) in the presence
of the attack u˜∞1 , which is obtained from the recursion
ˆ˜xk+1 = Aˆ˜xk +Kz˜k +Buk,
where the innovation is z˜k , y˜k − C ˆ˜xk. Note that the
estimate ˆ˜xk+1 is a sub-optimal MMSE estimate of the
state xk since it is obtained by assuming the nominal
control input uk, whereas the system is driven by the
attack input u˜k. Also, note that the random sequence
z˜∞1 need neither be zero mean, nor white or Gaussian.
Since the Kalman filter estimate depends on the mea-
surement sequence received, as a performance metric,
we consider the covariance of the error in the predicted
measurement ˆ˜yk as compared to true value yk. Further,
to normalize the relative impact of the degradation in-
duced by the attacker among different components of
this error vector, we weight each component of the error
vector by an amount corresponding to how accurate the
estimate of this component was without attacks. Thus,
we consider the performance index
E
[(
ˆ˜yk − yk
)T
Σ−1z
(
ˆ˜yk − yk
)]
= Tr(P˜kW ),
where P˜k is the error covariance matrix in the pres-
ence of an attack, P˜k = E
[
(ˆ˜xk − xk)(ˆ˜xk − xk)T
]
, and
W = CTΣ−1z C. To obtain a metric independent of the
time and focus on the long term effect of the attack, we
consider the limit superior of the arithmetic mean of the
sequence {tr(P˜kW )}∞k=1 and define
P˜W , lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
n=1
tr(P˜nW ). (7)
Notice that if the sequence {tr(P˜kW )}∞k=1 is convergent,
then limk→∞ tr(P˜kW ) = P˜W , which equals the Cesa`ro
mean of P˜kW .
Problems considered in the paper: We assume that
the attacker is interested in staying stealthy or unde-
tected for as long as possible while maximizing the error
covariance P˜W . We consider two problems:
(i) What is a suitable metric for stealthiness of an at-
tacker in stochastic systems where Assumption 2
holds? We consider this problem in Section 3.
(ii) For a specified level of stealthiness, what is the
worst performance degradation that an attacker
can achieve? We consider this problem in Section 4.
3 Stealthiness in Stochastic systems
Our first result provides conditions that can be used to
verify if an attack is stealthy or not.
Theorem 1 (KLD and stealthy attacks) Consider
the problem formulation stated in Section 2. An attack
u˜∞1 is
(i) strictly stealthy if and only if D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) = 0 for all
k > 0.
(ii) -stealthy if the corresponding observation sequence
y˜∞1 is ergodic and satisfies
lim
k→∞
1
k
D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) ≤ . (8)
(iii) -stealthy only if the corresponding observation se-
quence y˜∞1 satisfies (8).
PROOF. Presented in Appendix A. 2
The following result provides a characterization of
D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) that contains additional insight into the
meaning of stealthiness of an attacker.
Proposition 2 (KLD and differential entropy)
The quantity D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) can be calculated as
1
k
D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) = 1k
k∑
n=1
(
I
(
z˜n−11 ; z˜n
)
+D
(
z˜n
∥∥zn)), (9)
where I
(
z˜n−11 ; z˜n
)
denotes the mutual information be-
tween z˜n−11 and z˜n (Cover & Thomas 2006, Section 8.5).
PROOF. Due to the invariance property of the
Kullback-Leibler divergence Kullback (1997), we have
D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) = D(z˜k1∥∥zk1),
for every k > 0. Further, note that z∞1 is an i.i.d. se-
quence of Gaussian random vectors with zk ∼ N (0,Σz).
5
From (1), we obtain
1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1) (a)= −1kh(z˜k1)− 1k
k∑
n=1
E
[
log fzn(zn)
]
(b)
=
1
k
k∑
n=1
(
− h(z˜n∣∣z˜n−11 )+ h(z˜n)
− h(z˜n)− E
[
log fzn(zn)
])
=
1
k
k∑
n=1
(
I
(
z˜n−11 ; z˜n
)
+D
(
z˜n
∥∥zn)),
where h
(
z˜k1
)
is the differential entropy of z˜k1 , I
(
z˜n−11 ; z˜n
)
denotes the mutual information between z˜n−11 and z˜n.
Equality (a) holds because z∞1 is an independent ran-
dom sequence, while equality (b) follows by applying
the chain rule of differential entropy (Cover & Thomas
2006, Theorem 8.6.2) on the term − 1kh
(
z˜k1
)
to ob-
tain 1k
∑k
n=1−h
(
z˜n|z˜n−11
)
, and adding and subtracting
h(z˜n). 2
Intuitively, the mutual information I
(
z˜n−11 ; z˜n
)
mea-
sures how much information about z˜n can be obtained
from z˜n−11 , that is, it characterizes the memory of the
sequence z˜∞1 . Similarly, the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence D(z˜n‖zn) measures the dissimilarity between the
marginal distributions of z˜n and zn. Proposition 2 thus
states that the stealthiness level of an ergodic attacker
can be degraded in two ways: (i) if the sequence z˜∞1
becomes autocorrelated, and (ii) if the marginal distri-
butions of the random variables z˜(k) in the sequence
z˜∞1 deviate from N (0,Σz).
4 Fundamental Performance Limitations
We are interested in the maximal performance degra-
dation P˜W that an -stealthy attacker may induce. We
begin by proving a converse statement that gives an up-
per bound for P˜W induced by an -stealthy attacker in
Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we prove a tight achievability
result that provides an attack that achieves the upper
bound when the system (A,B,C) is right-invertible. In
Section 4.4 we prove a looser achievability result that
gives a lower bound on the performance degradation for
non right-invertible systems.
4.1 Preliminary results
We will use a series of preliminary technical results,
which will be used in the following sections to present
the main results of the paper.
Lemma 3 Define the function δ¯ : [0,∞)→ [1,∞) as
δ¯(x) = 2x+ 1 + log δ¯(x). (10)
Then, for any γ > 0,
δ¯(γ) = arg max
x∈R
x, (11)
subject to
1
2
x− γ − 1
2
≤ 1
2
log x.
PROOF. Since a logarithm function is concave, the
feasible region of x in (11) is a closed interval upper
bounded by δ¯(γ) as defined in (10). Thus, the result fol-
lows. 2
The following result is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 4 Consider the problem setup above. We have
1
2k
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
) ≤ Ny
2
+
1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)+
Ny
2
log
(
1
Nyk
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E[z˜nz˜Tn ]Σ−1z
))
. (12)
Further, if the sequence z˜∞1 is a sequence of indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random
variables, z˜k, each with mean zero and covariance matrix
E
[
z˜kz˜
T
k
]
= αΣz, for some scalar α, then (12) is satisfied
with equality.
PROOF. See Appendix B. 2
Combining Lemmas 3 and 4 leads to the following result.
Lemma 5 Consider the problem setup above. We have
1
Nyk
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
) ≤ δ¯( 1
Nyk
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)), (13)
where δ¯(.) is as defined in (10).
PROOF. Proof follows from Lemma 3 by using (12)
and substituting
x =
1
Nyk
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
)
γ =
1
Nyk
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1).
6
2The following result relates the covariance of the inno-
vation and the observation sequence.
Lemma 6 Consider the problem setup above. We have
CPkC
T = E
[
zkz
T
k
]− Σv (14)
CP˜kC
T = E
[
z˜kz˜
T
k
]− Σv. (15)
PROOF. By definition,
zk = yk − Cxˆk = C(xk − xˆk) + vk, (16)
and similarly
z˜k = C(x˜k − ˆ˜xk) + vk. (17)
Now both (xk − xˆk) and (x˜k − ˆ˜xk) are independent of
the measurement noise vk due to Assumptions 1 and 7.
Thus, we have
CPkC
T + Σv = E
[
zkz
T
k
]
CP˜kC
T + Σv = E
[
z˜kz˜
T
k
]
,
and the result follows. 2
4.2 Converse
We now present an upper bound of the weighted MSE
induced by an -stealthy attack.
Theorem 7 (Converse) Consider the problem setup
above. For any -stealthy attack u˜∞1 generated by an in-
formation pattern I∞1 that satisfies Assumptions 5-7, we
have
P˜W ≤ tr(PW ) +
(
δ¯
(

Ny
)
− 1
)
Ny, (18)
where Ny is the number of outputs of the system, the
function δ¯ is defined in (10), and tr(PW ) is the weighted
MSE in the absence of the attacker.
PROOF. We begin by writing
P˜W = lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
n=1
tr(P˜nC
TΣ−1z C)
= lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
n=1
tr(CP˜nC
TΣ−1z )
= lim sup
k→∞
1
k
k∑
n=1
tr
((
E[z˜nz˜Tn ]− Σv
)
Σ−1z
)
,
where we have used the invariance of trace operator un-
der cyclic permutations and the relation in (15), respec-
tively. The right hand side has two terms. The first term
can be upper bounded using Lemma 5, so that we obtain
P˜W ≤ lim sup
k→∞
Ny δ¯
(
1
Nyk
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1))− tr(ΣvΣ−1z ).
Since the function δ¯ is continuous and monotonic, we
can rewrite the above bound as
P˜W ≤ Ny δ¯
(
lim sup
k→∞
1
Nyk
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1))− tr(ΣvΣ−1z ).
Since the attack is -stealthy, we use Theorem 1 to bound
the Kullback-Leibler divergence D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1) to obtain
P˜W ≤ Ny δ¯
( 
Ny
)
− tr(ΣvΣ−1z ). (19)
Finally, substituting for Σv from (14) on the right hand
side and using W = CTΣ−1z C completes the proof. 2
Remark 8 (Stealthiness vs induced error) Theo-
rem 7 provides an upper bound for the performance degra-
dation P˜W for -stealthy attacks. Since δ¯
(

Ny
)
is a mono-
tonically increasing function of , the upper bound (18)
characterizes a trade-off between the induced error and
the stealthiness level of an attack.
To further understand this result, we consider two
extreme cases, namely,  = 0, which implies strictly
stealthiness, and →∞, that is, no stealthiness level.
Corollary 9 A strictly stealthy attacker cannot induce
any performance degradation.
PROOF. A strictly stealthy attacker corresponds to
 = 0. Using the fact that δ¯(0) = 1 in Theorem 7 yields
that tr(P˜W ) ≤ tr(PW ). 2
Corollary 10 Let the attacker be -stealthy. The upper
bound in (18) increases linearly with  as →∞.
PROOF. The proof follows from Theorem 7 by noting
that the first order derivative of the function δ¯(x) is given
by
dδ¯(x)
dx
=
d
dx
(
2x+ 1 + log δ¯(x)
)
= 2 +
1
δ¯(x)
dδ¯(x)
dx
=
2
1− 1
δ¯(x)
→ 2, (20)
from the right as x tends to infinity. 2
7
4.3 Achievability for Right Invertible Systems
In this section, we show that the bound presented in
Theorem 7 is achievable if the system (A,B,C) is right
invertible. We begin with the following preliminary re-
sult.
Lemma 11 Let the system (A,B,C) be right invertible.
Then, the system (A−KC,B,C) is also right invertible.
PROOF. From Assumption 2, the system (A,B,C)
has no invariant zero. Since (A,B,C) is also right in-
vertible, the dimension Nu of the control vector uk is
no less the dimension Ny of the output vector yk. Now
(A −KC,B,C) is generated from (A,B,C) using out-
put feedback, and hence the system (A−KC,B,C) does
not have invariant zeros either. Since the dimension of
the input and output vectors of this new system remains
Nu and Ny with Nu ≥ Ny, the system (A −KC,B,C)
is right invertible. 2
Let G′RI be the right inverse of the system (A −
KC,B,C). Specifically, we will consider the following
attack.
Attack A1: The attack sequence is generated in three
steps. In the first step, a sequence ζ∞1 is generated, such
that each vector ζk is independent and identically dis-
tributed and independent of the information pattern
Ik of the attacker, with probability density function
ζk ∼ N
(
0,
(
δ¯( Ny ) − 1
)
Σz
)
. In the second step, the se-
quence φ∞1 is generated as the output of the system G
′
RI
with ζ∞1 as the input sequence. Finally, the attack se-
quence u˜∞1 is generated as
u˜k = uk + φk. (21)
Remark 12 (Information pattern of attack A1)
Notice that the attack A1 can be generated by an attacker
with any information pattern satisfying Assumptions
5–7.
We note the following property of the attack A1.
Lemma 13 Consider the attack A1. With this attack,
the innovation sequence z˜∞1 as calculated at the con-
troller, is a sequence of independent and identically dis-
tributed Gaussian random vectors with mean zero and
covariance matrix
E[z˜kz˜Tk ] = δ¯
(

Ny
)
Σz. (22)
PROOF. Consider an auxiliary Kalman filter that is
implemented as the recursion
xˆak+1 = Axˆ
a
k +Kz
a
k +Bu˜k, (23)
with the initial condition xˆa1 = 0 and the innovation
zak = y˜k −Cxˆak. The innovation sequence is independent
and identically distributed with each zak ∼ N (0,Σz).
Now, we express z˜k as
z˜k = y˜k − C ˆ˜xk
= y˜k − Cxˆak + C(xˆak − ˆ˜xk)
= zak − Ce˜k, (24)
where e˜k , ˆ˜xk− xˆak. Further, e˜k evolves according to the
recursion
e˜k+1 = (Aˆ˜xk +Kz˜k +Buk)− (Axˆak +Kzak +Bu˜k)
= (A−KC)e˜k +B(uk − u˜k)
= (A−KC)e˜k −Bφk, (25)
with the initial condition e˜1 = 0. Together, (24) and (25)
define a system of the form
e˜k+1 = (A−KC)e˜k +B(−φk),
zak − z˜k = Ce˜k. (26)
We now note that (i) the above system is (A−KC,B,C),
(ii) φ∞1 is the output of the right inverse system of (A−
KC,B,C) with input ζ∞1 , and (iii) the system in equa-
tion (26) is linear. These three facts together imply that
the output of (26), i.e., {zak − z˜k}∞k=1 is a sequence of in-
dependent and identically distributed random variables
with each random variable distributed asN (0, (δ¯( Ny )−
1
)
Σz
)
. Now since zak is independent of e˜
k
1 , we obtain
that z˜∞1 is an independent and identically distributed
sequence with each random variable z˜k as Gaussian with
mean zero and covariance matrix
E[z˜kz˜Tk ] =
(
δ¯
(

Ny
)
− 1
)
Σz + Σz = δ¯
(

Ny
)
Σz.
2
We now show that the attack A1 achieves the converse
result in Theorem 7.
Theorem 14 (Achievability for right invertible
systems) Suppose that the LTI system (A,B,C) is
right invertible. The attack A1 is -stealthy and, with
this attack,
P˜W = tr(PW ) +Ny
(
δ¯
(

Ny
)
− 1
)
,
where W = CTΣ−1z C.
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PROOF. For the attack A1, Lemma 13 states that
z˜∞1 is a sequence of independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables z˜k each with
mean zero and covariance matrix E
[
z˜kz˜
T
k
]
= αΣz, with
α = δ¯( Ny ). Lemma 4, thus, implies that (12) holds
with equality. Further, following the proof of Theorem 7,
if (12) holds with equality, then (18) also holds with
equality. Thus, the attack A1 achieves the converse in
terms of performance degradation.
Next we show that the attack is -stealthy. Once again,
from Lemma 4 and (22), we have for every k > 0,
1
k
D
(
z˜k1‖zk1
)
=
1
2k
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
)− Ny
2
− Ny
2
log
(
1
Nyk
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E[z˜nz˜Tn ]Σ−1z
))
=
1
2k
k∑
n=1
tr
(
δ¯(

Ny
)ΣzΣ
−1
z
)
− Ny
2
− 1
2k
k∑
n=1
log det
(
δ¯(

Ny
)ΣzΣ
−1
z
)
=
Ny
2
δ¯
( 
Ny
)
− Ny
2
− Ny
2
log δ¯
( 
Ny
)
= .
Now with this attack, z˜∞1 is an independent and iden-
tically distributed sequence and the measurement se-
quence y˜∞1 is ergodic. Thus, from Theorem 1, the attackA1 is -stealthy. 2
Remark 15 (Attacker information pattern) Intu-
itively, we may expect that the more information about
the state variables that an attacker has, larger the per-
formance degradation it can induce. However, Theorem
7 and Theorem 14 imply that the only critical piece of
information for the attacker to launch an optimal attack
is the nominal control input u∞1 .
4.4 Achievability for System that are not Right Invert-
ible
If the system is not right invertible, the converse result
in Theorem 7 may not be achieved. We now construct
a heuristic attack A2 that allows us to derive a lower
bound for the performance degradation P˜W induced by
-stealthy attacks against systems that are not right in-
vertible.
Attack A2: The attack sequence is generated as
u˜k = uk + Le˜k − ζk, (27)
where e˜k = ˆ˜xk − xˆak as in (26), and the sequence ζ∞1 is
generated such that each vector ζk is independent and
identically distributed with probability density function
ζk ∼ N
(
0,Σζ
)
and independent of the information pat-
tern Ik of the attacker. The feedback matrix L and
the covariance matrix Σζ are determined in three steps,
which are detailed next.
Step 1 (Limiting the memory of the innovation sequence
z˜∞1 ): Notice that, with the attack A2 and the notation
in (23), the dynamics of e˜k and z˜k are given by
e˜k+1 = (A−KC −BL)e˜k +Bζk
z˜k = Ce˜k + z
a
k .
(28)
The feedback matrix L should be selected to eliminate
the memory of the innovation sequence computed at the
controller. One way to achieve this aim is to set A −
KC−BL = 0. In other words, ifA−KC−BL = 0, then
z˜∞1 is independent and identically distributed. It may
not be possible to select L to achieve this aim exactly.
Thus, we propose the following heuristic. Note that if
A−KC −BL = 0, then the cost function
lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E[e˜ne˜Tn ]W
)
, (29)
is minimized, with W = CTΣ−1z C. Since
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E[e˜ne˜Tn ]W
)
= E
[
k∑
n=1
e˜TnWe˜n
]
,
selecting L to satisfy the constraint A − KC − BL =
0 is equivalent to selecting L to solve a cheap Linear
Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) problem (Hespanha 2009,
Section VI). Thus, heuristically, we select the attack ma-
trix L as the solution to this cheap LQG problem and,
specifically, as
L = lim
η→0
(BTTηB + ηI)
−1BTTη(A−KC), (30)
where Tη is the solution to the discrete algebraic Riccati
equation
Tη =
(A−KC)T
(
Tη−TηB(BTTηB+ηI)−1BTTη
)
(A−KC)+W.
Step 2 (Selection of the covariance matrix Σζ): Notice
that the selection of the feedback matrix L in Step 1
is independent of the covariance matrix Σζ . As the sec-
ond step, we select the covariance matrix Σζ such that
CΣe˜C
T is close to a scalar multiplication of Σz, say
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α2Σz. From (28), notice that
lim
k→∞
E[z˜kz˜Tk ] = CΣe˜CT + Σz,
where Σe˜ ∈ SNx+ is the positive semi-definite solution to
the equation
Σe˜ = (A−KC −BL)Σe˜(A−KC −BL)T +BΣζBT .
(31)
We derive an expression for Σζ from (31) by using the
pseudoinverse matrices of B and C, i.e.,
Σζ = α
2B†
(
C†Σz(CT )†+ (32)
− (A−KC −BL)C†Σz(CT )†(A−KC −BL)T
)
(BT )†,
where † denotes the pseudoinverse operation. It should
be noted that the right-hand side of (32) may not be pos-
itive semidefinite. Many choices are possible to construct
a positive semi-definite Σζ . We propose that if the the
right-hand side is indefinite, we set its negative eigenval-
ues to zero without altering its eigenvectors. Note that,
if B and C are both invertible, then we could directly
set CΣe˜C
T = α2Σz.
Step 3 (Enforcing the stealthiness level): The covariance
matrix Σζ obtained in Step 2 depends on the parameter
α. In this last step, we select α so as to make the attack
A2 -stealthy. To this aim, we first compute an explicit
expression for the stealthiness level and the error induced
by A2.
For the entropy rate of z˜∞1 , since z˜
∞
1 is Gaussian, we
obtain
lim
k→∞
1
k
h
(
z˜k1
)
= lim
k→∞
h
(
z˜k+1
∣∣z˜k1) (33)
= lim
k→∞
1
2
log
(
(2pie)Nydet
(
E[(z˜k+1 − gk(z˜k1 ))
(z˜k+1 − gk(z˜k1 ))T ]
))
(34)
=
1
2
log
(
(2pie)Nydet(CSCT + Σz)
)
(35)
where gk(z˜
k
1 ) is the minimum mean square estimate of
e˜k+1 from z˜
k
1 , which can be obtained from Kalman fil-
tering, and S ∈ SNy+ is the positive semidefinite solution
to the following discrete algebraic Riccati equation
S = (A−KC −BL)
(
S − SCT (CSCT + Σz)−1CS
)
× (A−KC −BL)T +BΣζBT . (36)
Note that the equality (33) is due to (Cover & Thomas
2006, Theorem 4.2.1); equality (34) is a consequence
of the maximum differential entropy lemma (Gamal &
Kim 2011, Section 2.2); the positive semidefinite matrix
S that solves (36) represents the steady-state error co-
variance matrix of the Kalman filter that estimates z˜k+1
from z˜k1 . Thus, the level of stealthiness for the attack A2
is
lim
k→∞
1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1) =  = −12 log((2pie)Nydet(CSCT + Σz)
+
1
2
log
(
(2pi)Nydet(Σz)
)
+
1
2
tr
(
(CΣe˜C
T + Σz)Σ
−1
z
)
= −1
2
log det(I + SW ) +
1
2
tr(Σe˜W ) +
1
2
Ny, (37)
where W = CTΣ−1z C. To conclude our design of the
attackA2, we use (37) to solve for the desired value of α,
and compute the error induced by the -stealthy attack
A2 as
P˜W = lim
k→∞
1
k
k∑
n=1
tr(E[z˜nz˜Tn ]Σ−1z )− tr(ΣvΣ−1z )
= tr(PW ) + tr(Σe˜W )−Ny (38)
where Σe˜ is the solution to the Lyapunov equation (31).
5 Numerical Results
Example 1 Consider a right invertible system (A,B,C)
where
A =

2 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 2
 , B =

1 0
1 0
0 2
0 1
 , C =

0 0
0 1
2 0
0 1

T
,
and let Σw = 0.5I and Σv = I. Figure 2 plots the upper
bound (18) of performance degradation achievable for an
attacker versus the attacker’s stealthiness level . From
Theorem 14, the upper bound can be achieved by a suit-
ably designed -stealthy attack. Thus, Fig. 2 represents a
fundamental limitation for the performance degradation
that can be induced by any -stealthy attack. Observe
that plot is approximately linear as  becomes large, as
predicted by Corollary 10.
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Fig. 2. The converse and achievability for the right invertible
system, where the weighted MSE P˜W is the upper bound in
(18) and the weight matrix W = CTΣ−1z C.
Example 2 Consider the system (A,B,C) with
A =

2 −1 0 0 0
1 −3 0 0 0
0 0 −2 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 3

, B =

2 0
1 0
0 1
0 1
1 1

,
C =

1 −1 2 0 0
−1 2 0 3 0
2 1 0 0 4
 ,
which fails to be right invertible. Let Σw = 0.5I and
Σv = I. In Fig. 3, we plot the upper bound for the
value of P˜W that an -stealthy attacker can induce, as
calculated using Theorem 7. The value of P˜W achieved
by the heuristic attack A2 as presented in Section 4.4
is also plotted. Although the bound is fairly tight as
compared to the performance degradation achieved by
the heuristic attack; nonetheless, there remains a gap
between the two plots.
6 Conclusion
This work characterizes fundamental limitations and
achievability results for performance degradation in-
duced by an attacker in a stochastic control system.
The attacker is assumed to know the system param-
eters and noise statistics, and is able to hijack and
replace the nominal control input. We propose a notion
of -stealthiness to quantify the difficulty of detecting
an attack from the measurements, and we characterize
the largest degradation of Kalman filtering induced by
an -stealthy attack. For right invertible systems, our
study reveals that the nominal control input is the only
critical piece of information to induce the largest per-
formance degradation. For systems that are not right
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Fig. 3. The converse and achievability for the right non-in-
vertible system, where the weight matrix W = CTΣ−1z C.
The converse is obtained from (18 and the achievability is the
weighted MSE P˜W induced by the heuristic algorithm A2.
invertible, we provide an achievability result that lower
bounds the performance degradation that an optimal
-stealthy attack can achieve.
A Proof of Theorem 1
The first statement follows directly from the Neyman-
Pearson Lemma Poor (1998).
For the second statement, we apply the Chernoff-Stein
Lemma for ergodic measurements (see Polyanskiy & Wu
(2012–2013)) that states that for any given attack se-
quence u˜∞1 , for a given 0 < 1− pDk ≤ δ where 0 < δ < 1,
the best achievable decay exponent of pFk is given by
limk→∞ 1kD
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1). For this attack sequence and with
any detector, we obtain
lim sup
k→∞
−1
k
log pFk ≤ lim
k→∞
1
k
D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) ≤ .
Thus, by Definition 1, the attack is -stealthy.
Finally, the proof for the third statement follows
by contradiction. Assume that (8) does not hold
and there exists an -stealthy attack u˜∞1 such that
lim supk→∞
1
kD
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) > . Suppose that the detec-
tor employs the standard log-likelihood ratio test with
threshold λk at every time k+ 1. Thus, the test is given
by
Lk(η
k
1 )
H0
<
≥
H1
λk, where Lk(η
k
1 ) = log
fy˜k1 (η
k
1 )
fyk1 (η
k
1 )
is the log-likelihood ratio and ηk1 = y
k
1 (resp. η
k
1 = y˜
k
1 )
if H0 (resp. H1) is true. Define the conditional cumu-
lant generating function for the log-likelihood ratio to be
gk|0(s) = logE
[
esLk
∣∣H0] and gk|1(s) = logE[esLk ∣∣H1].
Note that gk|0(s) = gk|1(s− 1). Let λk be chosen to en-
sure that 0 < 1 − pDk ≤ δ for every k > 0 (notice that
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such λk always exists, because p
D
k increases to one as
λk decreases to zero). Then, for any sk > 0, Chernoff’s
inequality yields
pFk = P[Lk ≥ λk|H0] ≤ e−skλk+gk|0(sk),
or
− log pFk ≥ skλk − gk|0(sk).
Further manipulation yields
− log pFk ≥ skλk − gk|1(sk − 1)
= skλk − logE
[
e(sk−1)Lk
∣∣H1]. (A.1)
Now, by applying Jensen’s inequality twice we obtain
− log pFk ≥ skλk + logE
[
e−(sk−1)Lk
∣∣H1]
≥ skλk + E[−(sk − 1)Lk|H1].
Finally, using E[Lk|H1] = D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) implies
− log pFk ≥ D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1)+ sk(λk −D(y˜k1∥∥yk1)). (A.2)
Now, for any time index k such that 1kD
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) > , let
sk =
D
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1)− k
2
∣∣∣D(y˜k1∥∥yk1)− λk∣∣∣ . (A.3)
Using (A.2), (A.3) and lim supk→∞
1
kD
(
y˜k1
∥∥yk1) > , we
obtain
lim sup
k→∞
−1
k
log pFk > ,
which contradicts (6). Hence, the attack cannot be
stealthy, and the condition stated in (8) must be true.
B Proof of Lemma 4
By definition, we can write the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence can be written as
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1) = ∫ ∞
−∞
fz˜k1 (t
k
1) log fz˜k1 (t
k
1)dt
k
1
−
∫ ∞
−∞
fz˜k1 (t
k
1) log fzk1 (t
k
1)dt
k
1
= −h(z˜k1)− ∫ ∞
−∞
fz˜k1 (t
k
1) log fzk1 (t
k
1)dt
k
1 .
Now, zk1 is the innovation sequence without any attack
and is thus an independent and identically distributed
sequence of Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and
covariance Σz. Plugging into the above equation yields
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1) = −h(z˜k1)+ k2 log ((2pi)Nydet(Σz))
+
1
2
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
)
,
which we can rewrite as
1
2k
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
)
=
1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)
− 1
2
log
(
(2pi)Nydet(Σz)
)
+
1
k
h
(
z˜k1
)
. (B.1)
We can upper-bound the right hand side by first us-
ing the sub-additivity property of differential entropy
(Cover & Thomas 2006, Corollary 8.6.1), and then fur-
ther bounding the entropy h(z˜n) using the maximum
differential entropy lemma (Gamal & Kim 2011, Section
2.2) for multivariate random variables. Thus, we obtain
1
2k
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
)
≤ 1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)− 12 log ((2pi)Nydet(Σz))+ 1k
k∑
n=1
h(z˜n)
≤ 1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)− 12 log ((2pi)Nydet(Σz))
+
1
k
k∑
n=1
1
2
log
(
(2pie)Nydet(E[z˜nz˜Tn ])
)
,
with equality if the sequence z˜k1 is an independent se-
quence of random variables with each random variable
z˜n as Gaussian distributed with mean zero for all n.
Straight-forward algebraic manipulation on the last two
terms yields
1
2k
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
)
≤ 1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)− 12 log ((2pi)Ny)− 12 log (det(Σz))
+
1
k
k∑
n=1
1
2
log
(
(2pie)Ny
)
+
1
k
k∑
n=1
1
2
log
(
det(E[z˜nz˜Tn ])
)
≤ 1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)− 12 log ((2pi)Ny)+ 1k
k∑
n=1
1
2
log
(
(2pie)Ny
)
+
1
k
k∑
n=1
1
2
log
(
det(E[z˜nz˜Tn ])
)− 1
2
log
(
det(Σz)
)
=
1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)+ Ny2 + 1k
k∑
n=1
1
2
log
(
det(E[z˜nz˜Tn ])(det(Σz))−1
)
.
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We can further bound
det(E[z˜nz˜Tn ])(det(Σz))−1 = det(E[z˜nz˜Tn ]Σ−1z )
≤
(
1
Ny
tr(E[z˜nz˜Tn ]Σ−1z )
)Ny
,
so that
1
2k
k∑
n=1
tr
(
E
[
z˜nz˜
T
n
]
Σ−1z
) ≤ 1
k
D
(
z˜k1
∥∥zk1)+ Ny2
+
Ny
2k
k∑
n=1
log
( 1
Ny
tr
(
E[z˜nz˜Tn ]Σ−1z
))
, (B.2)
with equality if the matrix E[z˜nz˜Tn ] is a scalar multipli-
cation of Σz for all n Finally, using the Arithmetic Mean
and Geometric Mean (AM-GM) inequality yields the de-
sired result (12). For the AM-GM inequality to hold with
equality we need that tr(E[z˜nz˜Tn ]Σ−1z ) is constant for ev-
ery n. Collecting all the above conditions for equality at
various steps, (12) holds with equality if E
[
z˜kz˜
T
k
]
= αΣz
for some scalar α.
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